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How to End the European Financial Crisis 
– at no further cost and without the need 




There is a solution to the twin problem of large non-performing loans in 
the banking systems and the funding crisis for sovereign borrowers that 
is affecting especially Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, Greece, but to 
some extent also Italy and other countries.  
The needed policies constitute ‘true quantitative easing’: The author 
argued in 1994 and 1995 in Japan, introducing the expression 
‘quantitative easing’, that there was no need for a recession due to the 
bad debt problems in the banking system. Necessary and sufficient 
condition for a recovery is an expansion in credit creation used for GDP 
transactions – the original definition of ‘quantitative easing’. The 
expression was later used by central banks to refer to the type of 
traditional monetarist policy (bank reserve expansion) that had been 
warned would be insufficient.  
True quantitative easing can be achieved quickly and without extra costs 
in a two-part process as follows:  
1. The central bank purchases all actual and likely non-performing assets 
from the banks at face value (book value) and transfers them to its 
balance sheet.  
2. The government stops the issuance of government bonds. Instead, it 
funds any future borrowing requirement (including all scheduled ‘roll-
overs’ of bonds) by entering into loan contracts with the domestic banks, 
borrowing at the much lower prime rate. 
Ideally, these two measures are combined, and part and parcel of a larger 
policy package. For a fuller list of measures, see our CBFSD Discussion 
Paper No. 1-12.1 
But they can also be implemented separately, so if ECB and national 
central bank support cannot be gained for measure 1, national 
governments can end the negative vicious cycle and end their sovereign 
debt problems by going ahead on their own with part 2.  
                                                             
1 Richard A. Werner (2012), The Euro-Crisis: A to-do list for the ECB, University of Southampton Centre for 
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How to End the European Financial Crisis 
– at no further cost and without the need 
for political changes 
 
There is a solution to the twin problem of large non-performing loans in the banking 
systems and the funding crisis for sovereign borrowers that is affecting especially 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, Greece, but to some extent also Italy and other 
countries.  
The needed policies constitute ‘true quantitative easing’: According to the Quantity 
Theory of Credit (Werner, 1992), a major recession like the one that was likely in 
Japan at the time can be avoided if the right policies were taken:2 There was no need 
for a recession in Japan due to the bad debt problems in the banking system. 
Necessary and sufficient condition for a recovery is an expansion in credit creation – 
which the author called ‘quantitative easing’ (Werner, 1995), an expression that was 
later used by central banks to refer to the type of traditional monetarist policy (bank 
reserve expansion) that the author had warned were not likely to be sufficient.3  
The Japanese government did not adopt the recommended policies. Neither did the 
Japanese central bank, which insisted on continuing to rely on interest rate policies 
or, later, bank reserve expansion policies (which it misleadingly called ‘quantitative 
easing’ from about 2002 onwards).  
The empirical record speaks for itself: Japan remains mired in its twenty-year 
recession, soon to commence its third decade, while national debt has topped 200% 
of GDP.  
Fortunately for Europe, we now have the hindsight of the Japanese experience and 
there is even less reason why one should adopt failed and hugely costly policies, and 
turn down effective and costless policies.  
In the following sections the two main pillars of the policy package of ‘true 
quantitative easing’ are discussed. For a full set of policies, please refer to CBFSD 
Discussion Paper No. 1-12.4 
 
                                                             
2 Richard A. Werner (1992). A Quantity Theory of Credit, University of Oxford, Institute of Economics and 
Statistics, mimeo. See also Richard A. Werner (1997), Towards a New Monetary Paradigm: A Quantity 
Theorem of Disaggregated Credit, with Evidence from Japan, Kredit und Kapital, 30, 2, pp. 276-309. Available 
at http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/36569/ 
3 Richard A. Werner (1995). How to create a recovery through ‘Quantitative Monetary Easing’. The Nihon Keizai   
Shinbun (Nikkei), 2 September 1995 (morning edition), p.26 (in Japanese). English Translation available at   
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/340476/ . For further details of the policies proposed, see  Richard A. Werner (1998), 
Minkanginkoukarano kariire de keikitaisaku wo okonaeba issekinichou, Economist (Japan), 14 Jul., 1998  and 
Richard A. Werner (2002), ‘How to Get Growth in Japan’, Central Banking, vol. XIII, no. 2, November 2002, 
pp. 48-54  
4 Richard A. Werner (2012), The Euro-Crisis: A to-do list for the ECB, University of Southampton Centre for 
Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development, CBFSD Policy Discussion Paper No. 1-12. 
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1. How to solve the bad-debt problem in the banking 
system most efficiently and cost-effectively. 
The current approach adopted by the European and IMF leadership of how to handle 
large and growing bad debts in the banking system, for instance in Spain or Greece, is 
to ask the affected states to borrow even more money. This is further use of public i.e. 
tax money (either national, European or international), which is then employed to 
recapitalise banks and help them write off bad debts. This is a very expensive method 
and adds to the already major problem of excessive sovereign debt. 
Economics tells us that a zero-cost alternative is available, and has indeed been 
adopted successfully in the past. 
We must remember that the problem of insolvent banks, due to bad debts, is 
fundamentally a standard accounting problem: the balance sheet of banks shows a 
hole on the asset side: Instead of the original value of assets of, say, 100, the market 
value of the assets has dropped. This quickly produces an insolvent banking system, 
since already a fall in asset values by ten percent means that most banks would have 
used up all equity and thus would be bankrupt. Due to the nonperforming loans 
banks have also become highly risk-averse and unwilling to grant new loans. As a 
r e s u l t ,  b a n k  c r e d i t  g r o w t h  h a s  s l o w e d  t o  z e r o  o r  n e g a t i v e  i n  m a n y  E u r o p e a n  
countries. This is why domestic demand will stay weak in Spain, Ireland, Italy, Greece 
– if nothing is done to kick-start bank credit growth.5 
How can this accounting problem of non-performing assets be solved? If only we 
could use an eraser, rub out the nonperforming asset entries in the accounts, and 
write in a market value of 100 again! 
Actually, it can be done, without suspending any accounting conventions, by one 
particular player: the central bank. Spain and Italy have national central banks that 
have, according to the ECB, some discretion over their asset purchases.  
The problems with the national banking systems can be solved at zero 
new costs if national central banks were to purchase all nonperforming 
assets (actual, not official, since the official figures understate the scale 
of NPLs) from the banks at face value. Immediately the health of the 
banking sector would be fully restored.6  
Assume the market value of the NPLs is 20, but the central bank has bought them for 
100 (face value). While we have solved the problem for the banks, have we not just 
shifted the problem onto the central bank balance sheet? In other words, does the 
central bank not now face insolvency, with a loss of 80 on its purchases of assets for a 
face value of 100 although they only have a market value of 20? 
The problem is that NPLs render banks risk averse, which impedes their willingness 
and ability to create credit – thus resulting in a potentially long drawn-out slump. 
The above proposal solves this problem – at zero new cost to the tax payer. There is 
also no hidden costs: Firstly, central banks do not need to mark to market. They can 
thus keep such purchases on their books at face value for many years. Secondly, an 
important accounting principle is for accounts to reflect economic reality. The central 
                                                             
5 The Quantity Theory of Credit tells us that a necessary and sufficient condition for an economic recovery is an 
increase in credit creation used for GDP transactions.  
6 In the case of loans with non-assignment clauses (likely a minority), a law can be passed to allow compulsory 
purchase by and reassignment to the central bank. Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development        University of Southampton 
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bank could in reality not possibly make a loss of 80 on this transaction. Instead, the 
reality is that it makes a profit of 20. The reason is that the central bank has zero 
funding costs for this operation, yet obtains something worth 20 – a gain, then, not a 
loss. 
 
If it’s so simple and costless, why has no central bank done this before? 
Three major central banks have employed this method before: the Bank of England, 
the Bank of Japan and, most recently, the US Federal Reserve. The result: the 
operations were a complete success. No inflation resulted. The currency did not 
weaken. Despite massive non-performing assets wiping out the solvency and equity 
of the banking sector, the banks’ health was quickly restored. In the UK and Japanese 
case, bank credit started to recover quickly, so that there was virtually no recession at 
all as a result.  
 
Details: The UK Case 
It is August 1914. Britain has just declared war on Germany and its allies, the Austro-
Hungarian empire and the Ottoman Empire. However, a substantial proportion of 
international financial transactions between these Empires and the rest of the world 
were transacted through London, so that upon the British declaration of war, major 
parts of British banks’ assets consisted of securities and loans that could not be called 
and were, due to the state of war, legally in default. The British banking system was 
bankrupt – and in a much worse situation than in 2007 or 2008 when most recently 
British banks became insolvent.  
But since the Bank of England had no interest in creating a banking crisis and credit 
crunch recession, it simply bought the non-performing assets from the banks. There 
was no credit crunch, and no recession. The problem was solved at zero cost to the 
tax payer. 
 
Details: The Japanese Case 
In August 1945, the balance sheet of Japanese banks was far worse than their balance 
sheet in the 1990s or 2000s: non-performing assets amounted to virtually 100% of 
assets (since assets consisted mainly of forced loans to munitions companies and 
forced purchases of war bonds). The firms were bankrupt. The government defaulted 
on the war bonds.  
But in 1945 the Bank of Japan had no interest in creating a banking crisis and a credit 
crunch recession. Instead it wanted to ensure that bank credit would flow again, 
delivering economic growth. So the Bank of Japan bought the non-performing assets 
from the banks – not at market value (close to zero), but significantly above market 
value. The banks were healed again. Together with some other measures, bank credit 
growth recovered and so did the economy.7 
                                                             
7  For more details on the Japanese case, see Werner, Richard A. (2009). Financial crises in Japan during the 20th 
century. Bankhistorisches Archiv, 47, 98-123, available at   
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/186635/1/Werner_Bankhistor_Archiv_2009_postfinal.pdf  Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development        University of Southampton 




Details: The US Case 
The Federal Reserve has been the central bank most active in implementing this 
p o l i c y  i n  r e c e n t  d e c a d e s .  I t  p u r c h a s e d several trillion dollars worth of non-
performing assets from the US banking and financial institutions. This drastically 
improved their balance sheets and avoided default of many banks.  
Chairman Ben Bernanke was an active participant in the wide-ranging and intense 
policy debates in the 1990s centering on Japan, to which this author contributed the 
proposal of ‘quantitative easing’, including central bank purchases of non-performing 
assets from banks, and severely criticised the Bank of Japan. Bernanke was one of the 
more open-minded voices in this debate and often joined in the criticism of the Bank 
of Japan and calls for more drastic central bank action.  
 
Objections 
A frequent objection to this proposal is usually that it will produce inflation. 
However, this cannot happen: inflation can only come about, when those who are 
able to create money (the central bank and the banks, collectively forming the 
banking system) inject money into the rest of the economy, the non-bank sector 
(which is not able to create money). The asset purchases by the central bank merely 
constitute transactions between the central bank and the banks, re-ordering matters 
within the banking system. As a result, not a single dollar or pound is injected into 
the non-banking sector as part of this transaction. Hence there could not possibly be 
inflation.  
This prediction has been borne out by the facts. When the Fed multiplied its balance 
sheet size through its non-performing asset purchases, many observers thought this 
would create inflation and sharply weaken the dollar. Neither happened, for the same 
reason: no new money was injected into the non-banking economy.  
Another objection was voiced by Jörg Asmussen, executive director of the ECB, on 18 
June 2012, as a fellow-panellist during a public debate in Berlin. Obviously not 
having heard the present proposal before, and encouraged by the audience to 
respond explicitly to the proposal presented by this author – including the question 
why governments prefer to waste billions of tax money, when the banks could be 
capitalised at zero new costs to the tax payer – the highest ranking German official at 
the ECB responded by saying that such a solution could not exist, ‘because there is no 
free lunch’.  
Yet the solution offers no free lunch. It offers the most cost-effective solution. Europe 
has experienced a massive multi-year credit expansion in the banking systems in 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece, which have produced asset bubbles and vast 
resource misallocations, including millions of bankruptcies and home repossessions. 
These are real and high costs to society. The collapse that followed has greatly 
burdened government budgets and fiscal expenditure on the non-banking part of the 
economy, such as welfare, health and education, have been drastically cut. 
Unemployment has risen to record levels in many periphery countries. These are 
large-scale real costs – so it is preposterous to talk about a ‘free lunch’. Precisely Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development        University of Southampton 
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because this crisis has been so immensely costly to society it does not make sense to 
further add to these high costs through misguided banking bail-out policies. 
Finally, one often hears the objection that if one bails out the banks in this way, they 
will simply repeat their mistakes and return to their same old tricks soon – the moral 
hazard argument. The fact is, however, that governments have been bailing out the 
banks – using tax money. The moral hazard argument says that we should not use tax 
money, for it was not the tax payers that have been responsible for the bad debts. The 
principle is that those who mess up should pay up. This raises the question of just 
who is responsible for the banking crises that has befallen Ireland, Spain in 
particular, as well as Portugal and Greece.   
So who is responsible for the 25%, 30% or even 40% bank credit growth that was 
recorded for months on end, until about 2007, in countries such as Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Greece? Whose job is it to monitor and rein in bank credit expansion? In 
14 of the 17 eurozone countries, the banking regulator was the national central bank – 
a constituent component of the ECB System. Moreover, it is the job of the European 
Central Bank to monitor aggregate credit growth, for this measures the growth of the 
money supply. Did the ECB have the powers and tools available to prevent 30% credit 
growth in the periphery countries? It certainly did. The most powerful and 
independent central bank in the world has complete freedom to choose its policy 
instruments and policy targets. Revealed preference says that the ECB chose to allow 
a vast credit bubble, which must result – as these bubbles always do – in massive 
non-performing loans in the banking systems. So since the ECB has been responsible, 
it should also pay up. And the most efficient way at this stage is for it to purchase the 
non-performing assets of the banks. 
 
Political Obstacles 
The proposed policy is only possible with the cooperation of the central bank. So if 
governments have given up control or influence over central banks, as is the case in 
the European Union, the central bank has to be convinced by rational economic 
argument of the superiority of this measure in order to adopt it voluntarily.  
Since independence is a great privilege that imposes the moral responsibility on 
central banks to be transparent and accountable for their policies, the ECB needs to 
explain to the public why it is not inclined to adopt such a policy. If national central 
banks cannot be persuaded to voluntarily use their national discretion to implement 
it, they should be asked to explain in great detail why they oppose such a policy.  
On the other hand, the ECB’s policies have exacerbated the crisis, and thus created 
the opportunity for political changes and the creation for new, unnecessary European 
bureaucracies, such as the ESM. Furthermore, the ECB has been rewarded for its 
disastrous policies by obtaining greater political powers. Indeed, some authors had 
warned that the very extent of ECB independence, powers and lack of accountability 
was likely to result in wrong policies in the form of massive credit bubbles and 
banking crises in the eurozone (Werner, 2003, last chapter). There is thus a form of 
regulatory moral hazard in place: regulators that obtain more powers after crises may 
not have sufficient incentives to avoid such crises.8  
                                                             
8 In the English Version of Princes of the Yen the author warns of a major boom-bust cycle in Europe, with the 
European asset bubbles caused by an excessively powerful and unaccountable ECB. In the original Japanese 
version of Princes of the Yen, published in 2001, the author warns of how Alan Greenspan was creating a Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development        University of Southampton 
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Indeed, senior ECB officials have squarely stated that they favour the adoption of a 
banking union, Eurobonds, fiscal union, a European Finance Ministry and even the 
creation of a United States of Europe. Quite a few ECB leaders were personally 
connected to the people who co-authored the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, or were, as is 
the case with Jean-Claude Trichet, outright co-authors. 
Their argument has so far been justified by the claim that, in Thatcherite manner, 
‘there is no alternative’. This is why it is important to realise that there is an 
alternative that is economically superior, will maintain the euro and does not require 
any of these European centralisation measures. 
Bloomberg has even raised the possibility that the ECB may cherish the current 
ongoing slow-motion type of crisis, as it might consider it the best opportunity to 
convince national politicians and the general public to support the goal of the 
creation of a United States of Europe.  
 
“Central bank officials may be hoping that by keeping the threat of financial 
Armageddon alive, they can coerce the region’s people and governments into 
moving toward the deeper union that the euro’s creators envisioned.“9 
 
This would suggest an extreme degree of cynicism on behalf of the ECB. In any case, 
the ECB needs to be asked to explain why it is opposed to any bank bailouts that do 
not require further tax money nor a banking nor fiscal union. 
The baseline scenario is that the ECB is likely to oppose such a proposal, but it should 
be required to provide a sound reason for such opposition.  
While the ECB is unwilling to adopt Part 1 of this proposal, national-level 
government policy should opt immediately for Part 2. This does not get rid of the bad 
debts in the banking system in one stroke at zero additional cost, as Part 1 does. But it 
will achieve the same ultimate goal, and likely do so very quickly: namely to boost 
domestic demand, especially in affected countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Italy and Greece. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
massive boom-bust cycle that will burst, causing financial dislocation in the US. Excerpts from Chapter 19 of 
the Japanese original of Princes of the Yen: “When the US stock market collapses and overextended banks veer 
on the brink of bankruptcy, individual savers will not lose their livelihood, as they did in the 1920s. America 
now has a deposit insurance system. The problem is, however, that due to financial deregulation, the money is 
not in the bank anymore. Over the past 25 years, a dramatic shift of savings has taken place, from bank deposits 
to the equity market. Whether directly or via mutual funds, up to 50% of individual savings are now invested in 
the stock market. And there is no insurance against capital losses in the stock market yet.” … “Alan Greenspan 
knows that the economic dislocation that will follow his bubble will let previous post-war economic crises pale 
by comparison. Individual savers will lose their money. In the words of Alan Greenspan (1967): “The financial 
policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.” Large 
losses will be incurred by most Americans, when the Fed changes its policy and sharply and consistently 
reduces credit creation, as it ultimately will. A Great Depression is possible. Of course, it could be avoided by 
the right policies.”  Richard A. Werner (2001). En no Shihaisha (Princes of the Yen), Tokyo: Soshisha 
9  Bloomberg, Editorial, 25 October 2011, accessed at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-10-25/euro-s-
self-styled-saviors-could-be-its-greatest-enemies-view.html Their argument follows mine in Princes of the Yen, 
2003. Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development        University of Southampton 
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2. Enhanced Debt-Management: How to solve the 
sovereign funding problem in the bond markets – and at 
the same time stimulate domestic demand 
Today (24 July 2012) Spain paid a new post-euro record high interest rate on its 
newly issued government bonds. Borrowing rates in the bond market have risen to 
unsustainable levels. This was also the problem in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and 
could also easily become a problem for Italy. 
Observers are well aware of the negative feedback loops: the troubled banking 
systems, when dealt with through government money and not central bank money, 
worsen the fiscal situation of the government drastically. It is expensive to bail out a 
banking system. Ireland boasted a strong fiscal position, until its government offered 
to bail out the banking system. It subsequently teetered on insolvency and called in 
IMF (and European) funding. 
As speculators know when bonds mature and large tranches need to be refinanced, 
they can usually earn money by shorting bonds around these dates, hence pushing up 
interest rates. This makes it a self-fulfilling bet, since higher rates worsen the fiscal 
position of the government. 
A further negative feedback loop occurs via the credit rating agencies and alternating 
downgrades of banks and sovereigns. 
All these problems can be avoided altogether: they are the result of the government 
borrowing in a securities market characterised by a large number of short-term 
speculative transactions.  
This was similarly a problem for banks and their funding. But the ECB on 8 
December 2011 rightly decided to allow banks to become less reliant on securitised 
and traded debt, by substituting direct credit lines from the ECB (the long-term 
refinancing operation, LTRO). This happened after we had presented to about 50 
senior staff members at the ECB our proposal of how governments could similarly 
sidestep their funding problems, and at the same time solve several other problems. 
Why should the government rely on the bond market for its funding needs, under 
current conditions? It is a fact that the prime rate for borrowing from banks is far 
lower than the benchmark sovereign issuance yield. This is an anomaly resulting 
from the current financial crisis. Governments need to respond to this anomaly by 
exiting the bond market. 
The solution is for governments to stop issuing government bonds. So 
when the next tranche of government bonds are about to mature, where will 
governments obtain the funding from? 
Many commentators have proposed to ask the ECB to step in. However, this is 
problematic for many reasons, and far less efficient than our proposal. It also renders 
governments at the mercy of the ECB and its European unification agenda. But why 
do many observers anyway think the central bank should step in? Because they 
believe that the central bank is the main creator of the money supply. This is simply 
not true. The fact is that central banks only create about 3% of the money supply.  
A full 97% of the money supply is created by the private sector: the ordinary 
commercial banks in each country. This ability to create the bulk of the money supply 
makes them far superior to the bond market Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development        University of Southampton 
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Governments should thus enter into loan contracts with the commercial 
banks in their country. In other words, governments should not borrow 
via the issuance of tradable securities, but through direct credit lines 
from their banks.10 
Some observers believe that banks could not do this, because they ‘do not have the 
money’. That may be true in one sense. But this is true for any loan granted by a 
bank. Which is why banks do not lend money, they create it: banks are allowed to 
invent a deposit in the borrower’s account (although no new deposit was made by 
anyone from outside the bank) and since they function as the settlement system of 
the economy, nobody can tell the difference between these invented deposits and 
‘real’ ones. Actually, those 97% of the money supply are invented in this way.  
Others object that a mere switch from government bonds to bank loan contracts 
would not change much, or even anything. Well, in that case they could not possibly 
object to trying it out. And if they did try it out, they would be surprised at the 
significant difference it makes – a difference of night and day: 
 
This simple switch in funding, called ‘enhanced debt management’, has a 
number of major advantages: 
1.  The borrowing rate is substantially lower. Governments receive, according to 
Basel banking regulations, the lowest risk-weighting (zero). Thus they can 
borrow from banks at their favoured-client rate, which is the prime rate. The 
prime rate has been substantially lower than the sovereign bond rate 
throughout this financial crisis. In the case of Italy, we estimate that about 
E10bn can be saved in the next two years alone on lower interest charges. 
Furthermore, governments will deal with stable borrowing rates that are fixed 
throughout the loan contract period (say 3 years). Movements in the bond 
market become far less relevant. 
 
2.  The banks do not have to mark these loans to market. Moreover, they are not 
affected by downgrades from credit rating agencies. This severs the vicious 
negative feedback loop between banks and governments. At the same time, 
however, the banks can use these loans fully as collateral with the ECB for 
funding, as the ECB’s announcement of 8 December 2011 makes clear. 
 
3.  Instead of a negative feedback loop, there is now a positive feedback loop: 
banks will be happy to lend to governments, for one, because sovereigns carry 
a zero risk weighting according to BCBS rules. This means that banks will 
need zero new capital to back these loans. 
                                                             
10 The author has presented this proposal in Japan in the 1990s: Richard A. Werner (1998), Minkanginkoukarano 
kariire de keikitaisaku wo okonaeba issekinichou, Economist (Japan), 14 July, 1998; It was also published in 
English in the FT: Richard A. Werner (2000). Japan's plan to borrow from banks deserves praise. Financial Times, 
9 Feburary 2000. The author also personally explained it to government officials in Japan, among others, to Mr 
Hirohiko Kuroda, then vice-minister of international finance, who liked it enough, as he said, to pass it on to 
Andrew Smithers on his visit to Tokyo – who in turn wrote it up in his reports, whence it circulated in the City. It 
then came to be endorsed by Tim Congdon as well as Martin Wolf. It is explained in greater detail in Richard A. 
Werner (2005), New Paradigm in Macroeconomics, Palgrave Macmillan; A recent application to Europe is in: 
Helmut Siekmann and Richard Werner (2011), Eine einfache und gerechte Lösung der Schuldenkrise, Börsen-
Zeitung, 09.12.2011, Nummer 238, page 7. Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development        University of Southampton 




4.  The main business of banks is to lend, but they are not lending to the rest of 
the economy due to their risk aversion. Thus they do not generate earnings to 
retain and rebuild their balance sheets. Through enhanced debt management, 
banks will rapidly grow their balance sheets and earn decent income. Instead 
of primary market bond underwriters, such as Goldman Sachs, earning large 
fees in cosy relationships with semi-privatised public debt management 
agencies, banks will be the beneficiaries of this business. 
 
 
5.  Despite the above major advantages, which alone should make this an 
irresistible policy proposition, the single most important advantage of 
switching public funding to loan contracts from banks has not yet been 
mentioned: it will boost domestic credit creation – turning bank credit growth 
from zero or negative growth to positive growth (of about 3% in the case of 
Italy). This will increase demand and the money supply, ending the current 
debt deflation spiral, and generate nominal GDP growth, in the case of Italy 
between 3% and 4% above the growth otherwise possible. (This is the result of 
our empirical nominal GDP model based on our Quantity Theory of Credit). 
 
Enhanced debt management that exits securitised debt markets and relies on bank 
credit from the commercial banks will trigger an economic recovery. It is the 
necessary second half of the policy that would render the ECB’s LTRO successful: as 
we have seen, bank credit is currently still contracting, despite the LTRO. This would 
change drastically.  
The economic recovery, triggered by a recovery in bank credit creation, will increase 
tax revenues. Suddenly the negative spiral will be turned into a positive one. 
There is also a historical precedent for this type of policy: the economics is the same 
as that of the system of short-term bills of trade issued by semi-public entities in the 
years from 1933 onwards in Germany, which were bought by the German banks, 
hence increasing bank credit creation. These are known as ‘Mefo Wechsel’, after one 
of the issuers, the Metallurgical Research Corporation. This method was introduced 
by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, the German central bank, in 
1933.11 The method, which he called ‘silent funding’, was highly successful. As this 
author has argued elsewhere, the sharp German economic recovery from over 20% 
unemployment in early 1933 to virtually full employment by the end of 1936 was the 
result of the ensuing expansion in bank credit creation – in other words, it was the 
funding of fiscal policy through credit creation that caused the recover, not fiscal 
stimulus per se. Japan’s experience of the 1990s has proven how even far larger fiscal 
expansions will not boost the economy at all if they are not funded by credit creation 
(see Werner, 2003, 2005). 
In the 1930s the bills of trade were a preferable method at the time, instead of direct 
loan contracts with banks, since banks did not have to mark securities to market, and 
credit rating agencies did not exist. The method suggested, of direct loans by banks to 
governments, is a modern version that is more suitable to today’s regulatory and 
financial market environment. The effect of stimulating a recovery will be the same. 
 
                                                             
11 For further details, see Werner (2003). Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development        University of Southampton 
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